Effortless spontaneity may be the incarnation of profound grace, the mark of the sacred, but it is enriched by the patterns out of which it arises; the structured arrangements of its viscera; the predictability that composes its flesh. Cycling orders and redundancies are the pillars of novelty, weaving tapestries of unforeseen experience and expression. The preeminent example of open minds and hearts is flaunted, in my eyes receding from the supposed leashes of reason and its alien posturing. 

Change is something with which we are all presented in some way and, as a perennial concern of human inquiry (sometimes ironically professed as the only constant), it is at the core of Aristotelian examination and understanding of the infinite, which is an idea that rests as a stark contrast to the world as it is presented in our experience, as ever-changing but always in the realm of the finite, even as it is never seen or experienced in its entirety neither by any individual nor, arguably, any collective with the capacity to perceive. The continuity of change traverses through and in relation to its infinite potentialities as realized actualities, which present themselves as finite in their existent state. It is this mediating idea of potentiality and actuality that Aristotle utilizes to address and attempt to resolve the problems presented by either the presence of infinity (e.g., an infinite body) or its absence (e.g., circumscription of divisibility and number): “‘To be’, then, may mean ‘to be potentially’ or ‘to be actually’; and the infinite is either in addition or in division” (Ackrill, 1987, 118; Physics 206^a, 13-15). Thus, the infinite must be understood in terms of possibilities and never as an actuality of what is, for it neither can nor cannot exist as neither both probability and actuality nor as neither of them.

Aristotle arrives at the examination of infinity as a necessary step to understanding change: “Change is thought to be something continuous, and the infinite is the first thing that presents itself to view in the continuous (which is why those who try to define the continuous often find themselves making use of the definition of the infinite as an auxiliary, the supposition being that what is divisible ad infinitum is continuous)” (Ackrill, 1987; Physics 111, 200^b, 16-21). Therefore, according to Aristotle, infinity is directly related to change. He maintains that continuity has been defined in terms of infinite divisibility. From this, one feature (and solely with respect to infinity as the defining component of continuity, the feature) delineating infinity is that of unbounded division. While never directly referring to it, through Aristotle’s considerations it is apparent that infinity is understood in a more general sense as a quality or feature that exhibits unboundedness[1]. This more general understanding is then once again constrained, but this time it has two directions: (1) the aforementioned direction of unbounded divisibility or taking increasingly small increments or taking away increasingly small increments ad infinitum and (2) unbounded addition, aggregation, propagation or increasing magnitudes[2].

Firstly, in the case of infinity in addition, there are various problems Aristotle exposes by considering the presence of an infinite body: “if there were a lump of the infinite body, where will that be in motion or where will it be at rest, since the place of the body of the same kind is infinite? Will it then occupy the whole of the place? How could it?...” (Ackrill, 1987; Physics, 205^a, 14-17; neither motion nor rest is possible to determine; impossibility and indeterminacy of location); “...these components will in form either be finite, of infinite in number... if they are infinite in number and simple, the places will be infinite in number too and the elements will be infinite in number... and [if] the places are finite, the whole is too” (Ackrill; Physics, 205^a, 22-28; addition of finite things to equal an infinite number or magnitude is impossible; the presence of an infinite number of things is impossible; the presence of a finite number of things and an infinite body is impossible). Consequently, it is the case that an infinite body or an infinite set of finite bodies cannot manifestly or tangibly exist: “It is manifest, then, from these considerations that there is in actual operation no infinite body” (Ackrill; Physics, 206^a, 7-8). 

Similar problems present themselves for infinity in terms of division. If addition of finite bodies cannot result in an infinite body, as has been considered, it necessarily follows that division of an infinite body cannot result in a definite and finite number for a principle of combination that results in increased magnitude, such as multiplication, is undone by division. Therefore, it must be the case that just as multiplication or addition cannot ever arrive at infinity (though it can asymptotically approach it), so too division of infinity, though even at the outset a seemingly inane notion, cannot ever arrive at a finite result, no matter the multiplicity (for, furthermore, any multiplicity of finites must be definite in number and/or magnitude and infinity is by definition unbounded and therefore indefinite in this sense). This notion is reflected in conceptual mathematics, for dividing any number by infinity results in zero and if infinity is divided by any number it remains infinity. The argument for division by infinity follows the following basic form: if (P₁) infinity is numerically unbounded it exceeds any number, (P₂) division of a number  by any number greater than one (which is the identity) always results in a lesser quotient, (P₃) the divisor has an inverse relationship to the quotient, (P₄) zero signifies the absence of quantity, (C₁) the division of any number by infinity will always result in an absence of quantity[3].

 This itself is a metaphorical notion and cannot be demonstrated in actuality because quantity cannot be destroyed and equations that include the infinite as a definite number rather than a limit cannot be undone[4] (e.g., if a number x is divided by infinity and results in zero, multiplying zero by infinity will not result in x but in zero, for any number multiplied by zero results in zero). Thus, infinity cannot exist both in addition and division.

However, the absence of the infinite likewise results in contradiction and impossibility (such as finitude of number and indivisibility of magnitude), as Aristotle points out: “But if there is, unqualifiedly, no infinite, it is clear that many impossible things result” (Ackrill, 1987; Physics, 206^a, 9-10). Hence, because it is impossible for infinity to both exist and not exist, a further problem presents itself, that of the irreconcilable nature of being and not being (a contradiction derived from the preceding contradictions of both the existence of infinity and its absence). This calls for a mediating distinction that makes infinity possible in the ways it is necessary without resulting in contradiction. According to Aristotle, this distinction suggests that infinity must somehow exist and also not exist, but not in ways that are equivalent (i.e., in different regards): “...an arbitrator is needed and it is clear that in a sense the infinite is and in a sense it is not” (Ackrill; Physics, 206^a, 13-14). It is Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality and actuality as categories of that-which-is: “‘To be’, then, may mean ‘to be potentially’ or ‘to be actually’...” (Ackrill, 118; Physics 206^a, 13-15). The role of this arbitration is to resolve the difficulties presented by infinity and their implications. 

Potential exists as a possibility of the actual. That is to say, what in actuality is at any given moment has the capacity to become something else (change) in its parts or features and/or as a whole, and its subsequent form or state at any given moment is one of its potential existences prior to the realization of this form or state, or in relation to its previous form. This potential existence of something is the only sense in which infinity can exist according to Aristotle. Because increments are divisible ad infinitum, the potentiality of a shade of red that a rose might take on can, in principle, always be different from any shade of any red rose in existence. Yet once a rose exists in a moment, tangibly and in actuality, its shade is a given shade. It can be argued that degrees of freedom play into and thus circumscribe the potentiality of a given thing, such as when biology limits the potentiality of a whale so that change will never see it fly in any given moment in its life, when the cognitive capacity of an ant will never have it reason conceptually[5], or when pigment does not change when differences become too minute to affect it. This, if it is the case for all things, would eliminate the possibility for infinity to exist even as potentiality. Could it be that the numerical capacities of division and addition which lead us to conceptualize in terms of infinity are merely abstract and metaphysical, having no real role in change and potentiality whatever?

While it is plausible that all things are finite and have a finite and definite but unknown (and likely undeterminable due to the limitations of human capacities) amount of potentialities, it is equally beyond our capacities to exhaust most if not all conceivable relations, qualities, characteristics and so on, such that no potentialities exist outside what has been inferred as possible based on various examples of its actuality. Hence, Aristotle maintains that “...[infinity] is not that of which no part is outside, but that of which some part is always outside” (Ackrill, 119; Physics 206^b, 30-34). Although infinity is inherently conceptual, it has been robust to any and all examples of the actualities examined by human beings (even after the approximate 2,300 years since Aristotle first proposed these considerations), and remains an indispensable notion. Moreover, the span of such circumscription makes the argument against infinity as substantive move even further beyond reach (perhaps even all the way to futility) when considerations such as being and nonbeing and the ongoing passing of time are laid to account. 

Infinity must be conceivable, for the absence of infinity is inconceivable. Yet the presence of infinity as an actual characteristic or feature of that which exists is likewise inconceivable. The arbitration of the infinite provided by potentiality and actuality allows for both the sense in which the infinite is and the sense in which it is not for, as we have seen, both are necessary to conceive of what is and the continuity of changes and emergence in relation to what is. Thus, while infinity exists as a conceivable attribute of something/anything, in terms of addition and/or division, and is logically necessary for understanding change, it remains in the realm of potential and is absent in the actual trajectories of change as it becomes realized in time and space - the infinite becomes finite as the potential becomes actual. 

Footnotes

^[1] According to modern definitions, infinitude represents a state of being unbounded by number or extent, such as in distance or quantity (e.g., Hanks, 2003, 722).

^[2] For this reason, Aristotle declares that “...the infinite is either in addition or in division,” and that “Even Plato... made two infinites, because there seems to be an excess and a going-to-infinity both in extent and in reduction...” (Ackrill, 1987; Physics, 206^b, 27-29). All manifestations of unbounded behavior can be understood as either increasing/ongoing and therefore being added or decreasing/diverging and therefore being divided. 

^[3] In the case of addition, a simpler argument can be made: e.g., a number can be added to any sequence as a further unit without ever reaching a point at which the ability to add a number is exhausted: “...in the case of time and the race of men the things taken cease to be, yet so that the series does not give out” (Ackrill, 1987; Physics, 206^b, 1-2). 

^[4] There are myriad numerical problems with infinity that have been identified. However, to the extent of my knowledge, most if not all of these problems are based in the problem presented by the notion of infinity, which excludes itself from the set of all definite numbers and is tractable only in its conceptual relation to the number system. This is a relevant point to the current exegesis because what is can be extensively modeled and explicated through numerical computation (some even claim that all facets of reality including consciousness can eventually be quantified exhaustively and without remainder).

^[5] Probability theory may suggest that any possibility, no matter how inconceivable, is possible, though it may be highly unlikely that it will ever become actual. 

References

Ackrill, J.L. (Ed.). (1987). A new Aristotle reader. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hanks , P. (Ed.). (2003). Oxford english reference dictionary. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.

I would like to (1) suggest that self-evidence operates bi-directionally in relation to cognition and that (2) phenomena on which ethical or moral discernment is brought to bear through a particular interpretive position, claim, or action is rooted in axiomatic postulates[1], which are realized according to their self-evidence, and (3) to point out some of the immediately palpable implications of these characteristics. Abilities such as to perceive, understand, and know (by means of any given epistemological framework, followed or assumed), with the nature of their measure regarding capacity, play undeniably pivotal roles in one's discriminatory interpretations and the consequences that follow as choices and actions[2]. To discern and choose, which implies a level of understanding, is an act that is inextricably entwined with the extent of such abilities (whether seen as innate or acquired) and, in turn, the derivatively tangible conclusions of adequacy they employ.

As defined by the American Psychological Association, cognition is "all forms of knowing and awareness, such as perceiving, conceiving, remembering, reasoning, judging, imagining, and problem solving" (Cognition, 2007). Cognition is limited by degrees of extent: being aware of a circumstance is limited by factors, from conditioning, learning and prior experience to associations and states of consciousness within which the experience is occurring, that affect what is revealed. A situation in which one witnesses a purse being stolen from an old lady, for instance, will be cognized in cumulatively larger expressions of difference, in their reaction, by people who comparatively have cumulatively larger differences in the extents of the various factors that operate on and affect cognition. A man who has learned and believes in a perspective on justice that requires him, in his ability, to help by pursuing the thief is likely to act differently than a man who believes that everything happens to each person in a deterministic way, as it should. The structures of the psyche that are influenced and molded by different facets of experience and play constituent roles in the resulting qualities of cognition will necessarily influence the ethical or moral judgments and choices one makes and embodies as a consequence. Thus, when Epictetus suggests not seeking "to have events happen as you want them to, but instead [wanting] them to happen as they do happen" (Epictetus, 1983), he alludes to a state of mind or cognition that can be influenced and influences the choices one makes while moving through life. In a more general way it can be expressed thusly: change something about your cognition and change what is self-evident and, consequently, what is ethical.

            Self-evidence often serves as the basis of axiomatic postulates, underlying many ethical systems and principles. That is to say, underpinning ethical and moral discrimination are assumptions that reveal themselves in axiomatic postulates, especially as functions of knowledge and consequential inferences of relevance and adequacy. Indeed, it is self-evidence that serves as the very foundation of the moral claims made in the American Declaration of Independence – "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness…"(Hancock, 1776) – upon which an essential part of the moral and ethical frameworks that operate in virtually all domains of this and arguably many other cultures rest. Yet what is the role of the proposed self-evidence of such truths in humanity's ethical ideals? One not need look far to recognize the unmistakable prominence of antagonistic views.

The cruelties that diverge from the utopian view that "all Men are created equal," which have persisted through the entire history of humanity and certainly continue since its utterance, are certainly no exception. Boundaries that make room for inequality can even be seen in this greatly influential statement, for Women, as the modern notion of world-centric equality is held, are equally human and are also endowed with inalienable Rights. Yet an ethical position that maintains all life as equally valuable and intrinsically pluralistic, with no hierarchical variance or distinction likewise finds this to be a self-evident truth. A stance that tries to break the boundaries between humanity and other life to encompass all life is exemplary of such a contrast. The view that there is something important to be said for hierarchical distinctions, such as vegetative versus self-aware for example, is in this regard at odds with such pluralism. However, both views may nevertheless be consonant in holding that all life has some degree of intrinsic value as a self-evident truth.

Thus, self-evidence operates on multiple levels. From his initial distinction – "Some things are up to us and some are not up to us." – Epictetus infers that only when hopes and expectations are relinquished from that which is not of one's own doing can one be free and happy (Epictetus, 1983). Yet in following the ways this can be generalized to more particular circumstances, this distinction alone is no longer clear or adequate, if still necessary, in delineating the pathways of choice and action to be followed in order to arrive at a stance that embodies freedom or happiness or goodness (for the claim that such attainment is possible presupposes that it is a matter of one's doing, to which choice is necessarily relevant). The body, according to Epictetus, is not one's own doing. Yet if one were to relinquish all intentions in the way of engaging the body, clearly it would reflect differences in the physiological states of the body. Alternatively, engaging developmental practices that pervade the body with intention, which is one's own doing, will likewise have meaningful and far-reaching impacts on the body. At this level of discernment the self-evident distinction of within versus beyond the range of one's doing and control breaks down, giving way to keener and subtler interactions between this duality and other more circumstantial factors.

Alongside the ways contextual variations influence self-evidence, the distinction between ethics and morals – ethics being right action according to the confines of a particular group and morals as universal aspects of appropriateness and ought (Ethics, 2005) – likewise plays an important role. This distinction restricts the discussed relative nature of self-evidence, for while various contextual variables appear to mold axiomatic postulates and thus give rise to a multiplicity of often-incongruous ethical postures within individuals participating in a given ethos, the universality of morals, because it is not confined by such boundaries, must somehow pervade these relativities. It is furthermore curious in light of moral positions, for they too exist in incongruous multiplicity – most notably in ultimata such as "You shall not murder" (Exodus, 20:13), which is dissonant in relation to various permutations of the position that killing can be justified and can often be necessitated by situations like threat and survival. Verily, this need not pose a problem, for the universal is likewise bound by the relative contexts in the dynamical nuances of perception, perspective, and their limitative boundaries.

The nature[3] of a circumstance or situation must have a substantial level of coherence as a whole within variable perspectives of oughtness. This wholeness provides oneness or sameness that must extend to the perceiver as disclosure of its nature. Only in the presence of such constancy can difference in the multiplicity of ethical and moral positions arise. The requisite of such difference is the sameness from which it derives: different positions can be discerned in relation to a necessary element of sameness that unites them, such as a particular circumstance the oughtness of which is variable in the different ethical or moral positions regarding it, for in the absence of a unitary factor to cohere them, different positions are not dealing with the same territory and their difference is thus irrelevant[4]. This begs further questions: what aspects of a given circumstance are understood mutually, how are they related to differences in understanding, and to what extent do differences in understanding surrounding the unitary core of mutuality provided by a given circumstance contribute to differences in ethical and moral positions on the circumstance as object of ought? If, as noted earlier, such distinctions are predominantly functions of context – e.g. the extent of knowledge or the confines presented by ethos that bear on ethics – then the capacity of universality suggested by morals is unachievable, owing to the irreconcilable fracture presented by contextual and perspectival relativism. In light of its drastic departure from the efficacy and mutuality seen in everyday instances transmission of meaning and, consequently, understanding through communication, however, this is unlikely the exhaustive scenario. Thus, while understanding clearly maintains a crucial role in ethical and moral positions[5], it appears to fall short of accounting for the incongruence among them. 

Per contra, a discriminatory faculty distinct from reason and understanding participates in the construction and maintenance of the ethical or moral stance or act. This suggests that while capacities and characteristics of moral discrimination are at least in part dependent upon cognition and reason, they are nevertheless distinct. This is confirmed in integral philosopher Ken Wilber's claim that "cognitive development is necessary but not sufficient for moral development" (Wilber, 2003). The contextual dimensions that bear on ethical and moral claims and positions are molded by self-evidence, which is often unsuccessfully generalized to circumstances outside of the particulars of the given situation, as it leaves out important aspects present in and among those particulars. Such complex interactions seem to contribute to the how ethical and moral positions are realized and understood in important ways.

References

Audi, R. (Ed.). Ethics (Deigh, J.). (2005). In The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Epictetus, (1983). The handbook. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Hancock, John, et al. (1776). The declaration of independence. Retrieved October 2, 2007, from uhistory.org Web site: http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/index.htm

Moses, Holy bible (new King James version): Exodus.

VandenBos, G. (Ed.). Cognition. (2007). In APA Dictionary of Psychology (1st ed., Washington DC: American Psychological Association.

Wilber, K. Kosmic consciousness. (2003). Boulder, CO: Sounds True Prod.

Notes

[1] An axiom as I use it here signifies the in-and-of-itself acceptance as truth, and postulate points to the place of this acceptance as a necessary basis or foundation for reason the validity of which is characterized as the case via assumption.

[2] The possibility of this is assumed as a function of morality, for extreme determinism rules out autonomy and with it morals and ethics in general.

[3] Nature, here, refers to what is – the qualitative and quantitative nature and properties that can be experienced, objectively interpreted, and known as such – as contrasted by the oughtness of what should be – the stance of appropriateness with relation to what is, whether it suggests passivity in its alignment with nature or active choice.

[4] I think a plausible view of the contrast between ethics and morals is in the boundaries themselves, the former encompassing more limited groups – of humans for instance – and the latter, broader. Thus, the universality of morals can be derivative from boundaries the extent of which encompasses the entirety of that which is involved – all humans, for instance.

[5] Hence the Aristotelian emphasis on study, knowledge, and the wise man in reasoning regarding the good; some of the major departures from this view occurring with first with divine will, placing faith outside the realm of reason and subjecting morality to its domain, the rise of objectivism and empiricism of modernism that began to drastically differentiate nature from ought through scientific inquiry and thus questioning moral claims founded in speculative, rationalistic inquiry (which nevertheless relies heavily on role of knowledge and capacity of understanding), and the emergence of postmodernism, with relativism undermining hierarchical extents of reason in favor of perspective.

Kant’s metaphysical grounding for morality attempts to provide a categorical, unconditional foundation that moves through all conditions and circumstances of the empirical world and is itself, therefore, universal and not relative. Good will stands as the source from which morality, guided by reason, is derived: “As nature has elsewhere distributed capacities suitable to the functions they are to perform, reason’s proper function must be to produce a will good in itself and not one good merely as a means, since for the former, reason is absolutely essential” (Kant, 1997, 12). The good will, then, is the unconditional characteristic by which one voluntarily conforms himself to the moral law through categorical imperative-informed maxims. The categorical imperative is central to Kant’s conception of his meta-ethics, and is the principle by which maxims, respecting and conforming to moral law, can be realized from duty. In Kant’s meta-ethical foundation, where does this categorical imperative of deontological moral law generally stand in relation to the circumstantial, manifest world of consequence in which the appropriateness of ought is rooted in one’s respect for person?

Reason is a necessary precondition for participating in the moral world as conceived by Kant, for the autonomous capacity it provides allows one to be guided not merely by impulses that avoid harmful consequences and strive toward attaining happiness through empirical knowledge and circumstantial means, but by a priori universals: “Applied to man, [moral philosophy] borrows nothing from knowledge of him (anthropology) but gives man, as a rational being, a priori laws” (Kant, 1997, 5). Without the faculty of reason, one cannot be sensitive to the moral law unless it is restricted to consequences and impulses that govern behavior through these dimensions, within the boundaries of particulars. Indeed, Kant declares at the outset of his musings, “It need hardly be mentioned that the sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure and good will yet enjoying lasting good fortune can never give pleasure to an impartial rational observer” (Kant, 1997, 9). Thusly, the good will is purported as the fundamental quality of moral worth: “Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a GOOD WILL” (Kant, 1997, 9).

Kant continues to delineate the a priori constituents of the moral law through conceptions of imperatives and maxims. As Beck explains, “the conception or principle to which we refer in deciding on our actions is an imperative, which is an expression of an ought” (Beck, 1988, 239). An imperative, if it is to regard universal moral law, cannot be pragmatic, for it will then operate as a means to a specific end that cannot be universalized as law, but merely as a suggestion: “…such an imperative does not command, as a law does; it only counsels us to act in a certain way” (Beck, 1988, 239). In demonstrating that imperatives must be categorical rather than hypothetical or pragmatic for moral law to be possible, Kant points to and regards universalizability as the referential means by which reason can discern the moral nature of maxims that guide one’s behavior. Hence, he arrives at the infamous formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1997, 38).

Interestingly, the categorical imperative appears to itself be a hypothetical postulate. It makes use of universalizability while revealing not what is so but what is possible. Thus, by willing that a maxim become moral law one is actually discovering this possibility by viewing it as if it were so, not by attempting to somehow implement it in a way that it would become so in itself. However, this distinction might well be resolved by the a priori qualification of the categorical imperative – its hypothetical postulate issues from pure reason, not upheld or directed by empirical realities. Whether an ought remains possible through the discrimination provided by the categorical imperative is not contingent upon it ever being the case in the world of consequence. At the level of moral discrimination, means signify ends in reference only to the evasive, volatile, and ethereal degrees of congruence of future outcome potentials with prior experiences. The system of hypothetical imperative reasoning gives rise to intentionality by operating on the impressions, interactions and continuities of experiential domains in the perceptively contextualized moments within which actions are carried out and through which they reverberate. 

Intentions involve and imply ends by definition. An intention for and expression of what ought to be done can be conceived only from considerations of circumstance, condition, and consequence, but cannot voluntarily participate in the sphere of morals if it does not issue from duty to the categorical imperative: “…that which is connected with my will merely as ground and not as consequence, that which does not serve my inclination but overpowers it or at least excludes it from being considered in making a choice – in a word, law itself – can be an object of respect and thus a command” (Kant, 1997, 16). In this way, consequentialism is disqualified and superceded by deontology, which suggests that the domain of morality is, instead, delineated as an ideal established by the categorical imperative. When one’s actions are informed by fear of consequence or hope for gratification they cannot simultaneously be moral, though they may likewise not be immoral. As Beck suggests, “An act which conforms to the law but is not done because of the law is said to be legal, not moral (but not immoral either)” (Beck, 1988, 238-39). When one makes value judgments – “that’s good, bad, wrong, right…” – it does not necessarily follow that they either participate in deontological moral law, or are at odds with it.

Thus, as we have seen, universal morals laws are established in the metaphysical realm, through the autonomy and capacity of reason to go beyond impulse, upholding and informing the good will. Yet principles of ought at the level of practical reason may well also have a place in morals. While, as Kant suggests, a metaphysics of morals is indispensable in part “…because morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as the guide and supreme norm for their correct estimation is lacking” (Kant, 1997, 6), it remains so, that principles derived from “practical anthropology” may nevertheless have a role in the moral domain. After all, Kant acknowledges the necessity for “conditions under which what ought to happen often does not” (Kant, 1997, 4), so what dismisses this facet if not the possibility or even likelihood of corruption? The extent of influence of an action, together with the extent of awareness or the limit of reason, may be a watershed distinguishing the metaphysical domain of morality as universally binding law and the consequential domain of morality as a circumstantial expression of ought. (Though the latter is not considered morals proper by Kant, this is precisely because it does not derive from pure moral philosophy and thus does not partake in the universal as a law of obligation: “Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally (i.e. as a ground of obligation), must imply absolute necessity… The same is true for all other moral laws properly so called” (Kant, 1997, 5). This may well be part of the influence and grounds for the historical distinction between morals and ethics, the latter being an ought associated with a system of a particular group that operates within the marked boundaries of its ethos.)

While reason is held as the capacity by which a good will is produced and supplemented, it can be argued that this does not necessitate the sole participations of the good will as those honoring the universal. Although the categorical imperative provides the foundation for moral action, it does so only when reason is capable of extending itself beyond the many boundaries that confine one’s ability to partake in the universal. Modern investigations into the developmental nature of morality, for example, suggest that upholding one’s moral stance to worldcentric ideals (i.e. universalized) is not attained by the capacity to be rational alone. As integral philosopher Ken Wilber suggests, “cognitive development is necessary but not sufficient for moral development” (Wilber, 2003). Carol Gilligan, an internationally acclaimed psychologist and researcher, outlines three stages of moral development progressing from selfish, to social or conventional morality, and finally to post conventional or principled morality (1982, Gilligan). Her research points to morality as a characteristic present in everyone, but suggests different levels of care and concern. Selfish care is an egocentric moral stage that can be characterized by absorption in self-concern, and a motive to get what one needs or desires without considering how those actions might impact anything outside one’s self. Conventional morality is ethnocentric, characterized by a consideration of and concern for one’s cultural group and tradition (one’s ethos). Principled morality is a level of care that embraces universal values that are inherent in all cultures, regardless of ethical background and tradition, such as those professed by Kant.

Insofar as duty is concerned, at each stage of moral development there is a sense of duty, though it may not only be to universals but also solely as respect for one’s own self (egocentric), or merely respect for one’s group of shared interest and care (ethnocentric). I would like to suggest that Kant’s meta-ethical framework is confined to the sphere of morals as something that can properly exist only at the principled level of universal considerations. Kant concludes, in the good will’s adherence to the categorical imperative, that respect for person is the ultimate moral guideline; that, as Beck reiterates, “…humanity is an end in itself and a maxim which does not respect humanity both in oneself and in others cannot be a law valid for all people. The imperative requires us not to use other people merely as means to our own ends, but as ends in themselves” (Beck, 1988, 241). This does not appear to be altogether incongruous with the notion that this kind of respect must first pervade one’s self and one’s group before it can transcend these confines to embrace all people – humanity as a whole. As Ken Wilber maintains (2003, 459):

One of Kant’s central aims was to vindicate this moral freedom and independence of the ego-subject – to establish its autonomy as against the pull of heteronomy, or “other-directedness,” by which he meant especially the other-directedness of ethnocentric culture, of mythic (metaphysical) religion, and of lower natural inclinations and desires. The truly moral will draws its worldcentric perspective from within, from its own reason, and not from any external source whatsoever, whether that source be church or state or nature.

Thus, for Kant, a person is truly free – that is to say, truly self-determined, and not pushed by some external other – when, and only when, the person acts from a determination imposed by his or her own rational will. When I act from a worldcentric perspective, then I am truly free, free of the lesser and meaner stances that wound me in their shallowness. When I act from a worldcentric stance, I am truly free – and that worldcentric stance is itself generated and understood only by rationality (by universal perspectivism).