Kant’s Worldcentric Deontology

Kant’s metaphysical grounding for morality attempts to provide a categorical, unconditional foundation that moves through all conditions and circumstances of the empirical world and is itself, therefore, universal and not relative. Good will stands as the source from which morality, guided by reason, is derived: “As nature has elsewhere distributed capacities suitable to the functions they are to perform, reason’s proper function must be to produce a will good in itself and not one good merely as a means, since for the former, reason is absolutely essential” (Kant, 1997, 12). The good will, then, is the unconditional characteristic by which one voluntarily conforms himself to the moral law through categorical imperative-informed maxims. The categorical imperative is central to Kant’s conception of his meta-ethics, and is the principle by which maxims, respecting and conforming to moral law, can be realized from duty. In Kant’s meta-ethical foundation, where does this categorical imperative of deontological moral law generally stand in relation to the circumstantial, manifest world of consequence in which the appropriateness of ought is rooted in one’s respect for person?

Reason is a necessary precondition for participating in the moral world as conceived by Kant, for the autonomous capacity it provides allows one to be guided not merely by impulses that avoid harmful consequences and strive toward attaining happiness through empirical knowledge and circumstantial means, but by a priori universals: “Applied to man, [moral philosophy] borrows nothing from knowledge of him (anthropology) but gives man, as a rational being, a priori laws” (Kant, 1997, 5). Without the faculty of reason, one cannot be sensitive to the moral law unless it is restricted to consequences and impulses that govern behavior through these dimensions, within the boundaries of particulars. Indeed, Kant declares at the outset of his musings, “It need hardly be mentioned that the sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure and good will yet enjoying lasting good fortune can never give pleasure to an impartial rational observer” (Kant, 1997, 9). Thusly, the good will is purported as the fundamental quality of moral worth: “Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a GOOD WILL” (Kant, 1997, 9).

Kant continues to delineate the a priori constituents of the moral law through conceptions of imperatives and maxims. As Beck explains, “the conception or principle to which we refer in deciding on our actions is an imperative, which is an expression of an ought” (Beck, 1988, 239). An imperative, if it is to regard universal moral law, cannot be pragmatic, for it will then operate as a means to a specific end that cannot be universalized as law, but merely as a suggestion: “…such an imperative does not command, as a law does; it only counsels us to act in a certain way” (Beck, 1988, 239). In demonstrating that imperatives must be categorical rather than hypothetical or pragmatic for moral law to be possible, Kant points to and regards universalizability as the referential means by which reason can discern the moral nature of maxims that guide one’s behavior. Hence, he arrives at the infamous formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1997, 38).

Interestingly, the categorical imperative appears to itself be a hypothetical postulate. It makes use of universalizability while revealing not what is so but what is possible. Thus, by willing that a maxim become moral law one is actually discovering this possibility by viewing it as if it were so, not by attempting to somehow implement it in a way that it would become so in itself. However, this distinction might well be resolved by the a priori qualification of the categorical imperative – its hypothetical postulate issues from pure reason, not upheld or directed by empirical realities. Whether an ought remains possible through the discrimination provided by the categorical imperative is not contingent upon it ever being the case in the world of consequence. At the level of moral discrimination, means signify ends in reference only to the evasive, volatile, and ethereal degrees of congruence of future outcome potentials with prior experiences. The system of hypothetical imperative reasoning gives rise to intentionality by operating on the impressions, interactions and continuities of experiential domains in the perceptively contextualized moments within which actions are carried out and through which they reverberate. 

Intentions involve and imply ends by definition. An intention for and expression of what ought to be done can be conceived only from considerations of circumstance, condition, and consequence, but cannot voluntarily participate in the sphere of morals if it does not issue from duty to the categorical imperative: “…that which is connected with my will merely as ground and not as consequence, that which does not serve my inclination but overpowers it or at least excludes it from being considered in making a choice – in a word, law itself – can be an object of respect and thus a command” (Kant, 1997, 16). In this way, consequentialism is disqualified and superceded by deontology, which suggests that the domain of morality is, instead, delineated as an ideal established by the categorical imperative. When one’s actions are informed by fear of consequence or hope for gratification they cannot simultaneously be moral, though they may likewise not be immoral. As Beck suggests, “An act which conforms to the law but is not done because of the law is said to be legal, not moral (but not immoral either)” (Beck, 1988, 238-39). When one makes value judgments – “that’s good, bad, wrong, right…” – it does not necessarily follow that they either participate in deontological moral law, or are at odds with it.

Thus, as we have seen, universal morals laws are established in the metaphysical realm, through the autonomy and capacity of reason to go beyond impulse, upholding and informing the good will. Yet principles of ought at the level of practical reason may well also have a place in morals. While, as Kant suggests, a metaphysics of morals is indispensable in part “…because morals themselves remain subject to all kinds of corruption so long as the guide and supreme norm for their correct estimation is lacking” (Kant, 1997, 6), it remains so, that principles derived from “practical anthropology” may nevertheless have a role in the moral domain. After all, Kant acknowledges the necessity for “conditions under which what ought to happen often does not” (Kant, 1997, 4), so what dismisses this facet if not the possibility or even likelihood of corruption? The extent of influence of an action, together with the extent of awareness or the limit of reason, may be a watershed distinguishing the metaphysical domain of morality as universally binding law and the consequential domain of morality as a circumstantial expression of ought. (Though the latter is not considered morals proper by Kant, this is precisely because it does not derive from pure moral philosophy and thus does not partake in the universal as a law of obligation: “Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally (i.e. as a ground of obligation), must imply absolute necessity… The same is true for all other moral laws properly so called” (Kant, 1997, 5). This may well be part of the influence and grounds for the historical distinction between morals and ethics, the latter being an ought associated with a system of a particular group that operates within the marked boundaries of its ethos.)

While reason is held as the capacity by which a good will is produced and supplemented, it can be argued that this does not necessitate the sole participations of the good will as those honoring the universal. Although the categorical imperative provides the foundation for moral action, it does so only when reason is capable of extending itself beyond the many boundaries that confine one’s ability to partake in the universal. Modern investigations into the developmental nature of morality, for example, suggest that upholding one’s moral stance to worldcentric ideals (i.e. universalized) is not attained by the capacity to be rational alone. As integral philosopher Ken Wilber suggests, “cognitive development is necessary but not sufficient for moral development” (Wilber, 2003). Carol Gilligan, an internationally acclaimed psychologist and researcher, outlines three stages of moral development progressing from selfish, to social or conventional morality, and finally to post conventional or principled morality (1982, Gilligan). Her research points to morality as a characteristic present in everyone, but suggests different levels of care and concern. Selfish care is an egocentric moral stage that can be characterized by absorption in self-concern, and a motive to get what one needs or desires without considering how those actions might impact anything outside one’s self. Conventional morality is ethnocentric, characterized by a consideration of and concern for one’s cultural group and tradition (one’s ethos). Principled morality is a level of care that embraces universal values that are inherent in all cultures, regardless of ethical background and tradition, such as those professed by Kant.

Insofar as duty is concerned, at each stage of moral development there is a sense of duty, though it may not only be to universals but also solely as respect for one’s own self (egocentric), or merely respect for one’s group of shared interest and care (ethnocentric). I would like to suggest that Kant’s meta-ethical framework is confined to the sphere of morals as something that can properly exist only at the principled level of universal considerations. Kant concludes, in the good will’s adherence to the categorical imperative, that respect for person is the ultimate moral guideline; that, as Beck reiterates, “…humanity is an end in itself and a maxim which does not respect humanity both in oneself and in others cannot be a law valid for all people. The imperative requires us not to use other people merely as means to our own ends, but as ends in themselves” (Beck, 1988, 241). This does not appear to be altogether incongruous with the notion that this kind of respect must first pervade one’s self and one’s group before it can transcend these confines to embrace all people – humanity as a whole. As Ken Wilber maintains (2003, 459):

One of Kant’s central aims was to vindicate this moral freedom and independence of the ego-subject – to establish its autonomy as against the pull of heteronomy, or “other-directedness,” by which he meant especially the other-directedness of ethnocentric culture, of mythic (metaphysical) religion, and of lower natural inclinations and desires. The truly moral will draws its worldcentric perspective from within, from its own reason, and not from any external source whatsoever, whether that source be church or state or nature.

Thus, for Kant, a person is truly free – that is to say, truly self-determined, and not pushed by some external other – when, and only when, the person acts from a determination imposed by his or her own rational will. When I act from a worldcentric perspective, then I am truly free, free of the lesser and meaner stances that wound me in their shallowness. When I act from a worldcentric stance, I am truly free – and that worldcentric stance is itself generated and understood only by rationality (by universal perspectivism).